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By Cynthia Ford
“Where you lead, I will follow
Anywhere that you tell me to
If you need, you need me to be with you
I will follow where you lead…”
— Carole King, “Where You Lead”
The tendency of the led to follow the leader is exactly the 
point of MRE 611(c), which provides:
Leading questions. Leading questions should 
not be used on the direct examination of a witness 
except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ 
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should 
be permitted on cross-examination. When a 
party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, 
or a witness identified with an adverse party, 
interrogation may be by leading questions.
This rule is identical in substance to FRE 611(c), which in its 
restyled version reads:
Leading Questions. Leading questions should 
not be used on direct examination except as 
necessary to develop the witness’s [NOTE THE 
DIFFERENCE IN APOSTROPHE PLACEMENT 
FROM MRE VERSION] testimony. Ordinarily, 
the court should allow leading questions: 
(1) on cross-examination; and 
(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse 
party, or a witness identified with an adverse 
party. 
The objection which enforces this rule is, of course, familiar 
to all of us: “Objection, Your Honor, Leading.” An inquisitive 
reader of an earlier column suggested this subject, with a 
particular emphasis on two specific issues: the purpose behind 
the “no leading on direct” rule and how to tell a leading from a 
non-leading question.  My experience teaching Evidence and 
coaching the University of Montana Trial Team, as well as my 
own trial experience, confirms that these are valid concerns 
worthy of our attention this month.  
THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE  
“NO-LEADING ON DIRECT” RULE
The Federal Advisory Committee Note to FRE 611(c) 
explains that:
The rule continues the traditional view 
that the suggestive powers of the leading 
question are as a general proposition 
undesirable. [Emphasis added]
The Montana Commission Comment to MRE 611(c) notes 
that the Montana version is identical to the then-current FRE 
611(c), and expresses Montana’s agreement with the purpose of 
the rule:
It recognizes the traditional view that leading 
questions, that is, questions which suggest the 
desired answer, are generally undesirable 
on direct examination, for the witness “ 
... may acquiesce in a false suggestion”. 
McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence 8 
(2d ed. 1972). [Emphasis added]
The U.S. Supreme Court, affirming a decision in an 
admiralty case which disregarded the thrust of one of the key 
witnesses, noted: 
A refusal to credit the uncorroborated 
testimony of the director-partner, who obviously 
was not disinterested in the outcome of the 
litigation, would not be considered clearly 
erroneous. … This is especially so when such 
testimony is prompted by leading questions as 
was the case here.5 [FN 5: “At one point the judge 
interrupted the direct examination of the witness 
to point out he could not ‘give any credit to a 
witness answering leading questions.’]
Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 702-03, 82 
S. Ct. 1095, 1098, 8 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1962).
My own explanation is that when you have a witness 
“friendly” to your side of the case, that witness will necessarily 
be like Carole King, happy to go anywhere you suggest.  The 
lawyer is providing the information, and the witness is just 
replying “Yes” or “Exactly” or “That’s right.”  It is certainly 
true that this method of examination is the quickest, most 
efficient, and easiest for both the lawyer and the agreeable 
witness.  It is equally true that the lawyer cannot testify.  First, 
the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct forbid an attorney 
from testifying at trial.1  Moreover, because the lawyer did 
1  Rule 3.4(e) states that a lawyer “shall not … assert personal knowledge of facts 
in issue except when testifying as a witness…”  Rule 3.7 is entitled “Lawyer as Wit-
ness” and generally provides that “a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial 
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness” although there are some 
limited exceptions to this prohibition.
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not herself perceive the event at issue, she cannot provide the 
proper information to the court.  MRE 602 requires that every 
non-expert witness have “personal knowledge of the matter.” 
The witness on the stand, not the lawyer at the podium, has 
personal knowledge and must communicate it to the jury as his 
own memory and wording dictate.  
HOW TO TELL LEADING FROM NON-LEADING 
QUESTIONS: “YES OR NO” IS NOT ENOUGH
If the questioning is on direct examination of a witness 
friendly to the proponent, the objection should be sustained 
if the question is, in fact, leading.  A bit mysteriously, neither 
the state nor federal version of Rule 611(C) provides any 
definition of either type of question.  Luckily for Montanans, 
our legislature has enacted a statute which defines evidentiary 
terms:
26-1-101. General definitions. (1) “Direct 
examination” is the first examination of a witness 
on a particular matter. “Cross-examination” is the 
examination of a witness by a party other than the 
direct examiner.
(3) A “leading question” is a question which 
suggests to the witness the answer which the 
examining party desires.2
The Montana Supreme Court recently elaborated on the 
statutory definition, looking to California for guidance, and 
concluded that the fact that a question can be answered simply 
“Yes” or “No” does not make it leading.  The touchstone, 
instead, is whether the examiner indicates to the witness how 
she is to answer, suggesting that “yes” is the correct answer or 
that “no” is not.  
In State v. Lindberg, 347 Mont. 76, 196 P.3d 1252, 2008 
MT 389, the defendant was convicted of several illegal sexual 
activities with young members of his girlfriend’s household.  
One of these was a sexual intercourse without consent charge 
involving alleged victim H.B. who was 20 at the time of trial.  
After he was convicted, Lindberg claimed ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failure to object to leading questions posed on 
direct to H.B.:
¶ 12 … During her first testimony, H.B., then 
approximately twenty years of age, struggled when 
recounting Lindberg’s alleged acts and repeatedly 
broke down in tears. The District Court recessed 
for the day, and resumed the next morning with 
her testimony. However, H.B. continued to have 
difficulty completing her testimony. The District 
Court allowed her to be excused and received 
testimony from A.T. and B.B. before again 
2  At the time the MRE were written, the Commission noted that 611(c) was con-
sistent with existing Montana law:  “Section 93-1901-5, R.C.M. 1947 [26-1-101], 
provides:
A question which suggests to the witness by the answer which the examining 
party desires is denominated a leading or suggestive question. On a direct exami-
nation, leading questions are not allowed, except in the sound discretion of the 
court, under special circumstances making it appear that the interest of justice 
requires it.”
having H.B. return to the stand. At this point, 
the State began using leading questions to elicit 
testimony from her. Lindberg’s counsel objected 
twice throughout the examination. On the first 
occasion, Lindberg’s counsel objected on the 
grounds that all the questions used were leading 
questions. The District Court overruled the 
objection. Later in H.B.’s testimony, Lindberg’s 
counsel again objected stating “Your honor, 
I would3 object. Continuing leading—a lot of 
leading questions here.” The District Court 
denied the objection stating: “This one’s not.” 
At the very end of her direct examination, the 
State asked H.B. the following question: “At any 
time during the 1995 through 1998 incidents 
did the defendant penetrate your vagina?” H.B. 
responded “Yes.” Lindberg’s counsel did not 
object to this question.
¶ 13 After H.B. concluded her testimony, 
Lindberg’s trial counsel moved to strike it 
completely on the grounds that it had been 
developed through the use of leading questions. 
The motion was denied. Lindberg’s counsel 
also moved for a mistrial on the same grounds. 
However, when the District Court requested 
authority in support of Lindberg’s motion, 
Lindberg’s trial counsel could not provide any. 
The District Court denied the motion for a 
mistrial.
Lindberg asserts that the only evidence that 
he penetrated H.B. came in response to a leading 
question from the prosecution to which his trial 
counsel did not object. (See ¶ 12). Without this 
leading question and H.B.’s response, Lindberg 
argues he would have been entitled to a directed 
verdict on the sexual intercourse without consent 
charge because penetration is a necessary element 
of that offense, and, aside from H.B.’s answer 
to the leading question, no other evidence was 
provided. Lindberg also notes that the jury 
seemingly recognized the State’s difficulty in 
proving the elements of sexual intercourse 
without consent. During its deliberations, the jury 
sent a question to the court asking “Did [H.B.] 
actually speak the word ‘penetration’ or was it 
posed as a yes or no question?” Additionally, 
the jury asked if it would be possible to have 
a transcript of H.B.’s testimony. However, the 
District Court declined to provide an answer or 
a transcript, requiring the jury to rely on its own 
memory and notes. (Emphasis added.)
347 Mont. at 80- 89.  
3  My own grammatical view is that when someone says, “I would like to object” 
the judge should respond, “Then do so.”  The use of the subjunctive does not tech-
nically indicate that the speaker is objecting.  Perhaps I am getting old and cranky? 
At any rate, I recommend that you stick with the clearer and more direct “Objec-
tion” or, at most, “I object.”
EVIDENCE, from previous page
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On appeal, the Supreme Court discussed the definition 
of a “leading question” and then applied it to the penetration 
question asked of H.B.:
A review of the trial transcripts demonstrates 
that the prosecutor did indeed employ some 
leading questions in his examination of H.B. 
Lindberg’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim as to the leading question matter centers 
solely, however, on the notion that the specific 
question “At any time during the 1995 through 
1998 incidents did the defendant penetrate 
your vagina?” is a leading question, and that his 
counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to 
object to it. We are unconvinced that, from an 
objective standpoint, this is in fact a leading 
question which would have been disallowed by 
the District Court upon proper objection.
¶ 45 Section 26–1–101(3), MCA, defines 
a “leading question” as “a question which 
suggests to the witness the answer which the 
examining party desires.” M.R. Evid. 611 provides: 
“Leading questions should not be used on direct 
examination of a witness except as may be 
necessary to develop the witness’ testimony.” …
whether or not leading questions will be allowed is 
a matter within the trial court’s discretion.
¶ 46 In People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 635, 
66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752 (1997), the 
California Supreme Court stated that “[a] 
question calling for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer 
is a leading question only if, under the 
circumstances, it is obvious that the examiner 
is suggesting that the witness answer the 
question one way only, whether it be ‘yes’ or 
‘no.’ ” Williams, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 
at 774 (quotations omitted). The fact that the 
specific question to which Lindberg now objects 
on appeal is one which could be answered with 
a “yes” or “no” does not, ipso facto, make the 
question a leading question. In order to establish 
deficient performance and prejudice, Lindberg 
must show that the prosecution instructed or 
suggested to H.B. how the question should be 
answered, and further that, had the objection 
been timely made, the District Court would 
have concluded that the question was leading 
and would be disallowed. Lindberg has failed to 
establish either matter. Because the question was 
arguably not leading and because the allowance 
of leading questions is in any event a matter 
within the trial court’s discretion, we cannot 
say from a standpoint of objective reasonableness 
that counsel’s performance in failing to object 
to this question was deficient, or that Lindberg 
was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object. 
(Emphasis added)
347 Mont. at 90-91.  
In an earlier case, before the adoption of Rule 611(c), the 
Montana Supreme Court also held an objected-to question 
to be non-leading and thus allowable.  The defendant was 
charged with assault with a pistol during a mining altercation in 
Jefferson County.  The prosecutor called the victim:
Defendant’s first assignment of error is based 
upon the ruling of the court upon the question 
propounded by the county attorney to the 
prosecuting witness: “Q. Were you afraid he 
might shoot you if you didn’t?” Appellant insists 
that the question propounded to the witness was 
leading and suggested the answer desired. One 
of the ingredients of the crime of assault in the 
second degree is as to whether the complaining 
witness was actually put in fear of immediate 
bodily injury, and that the circumstances of the 
case were such as ordinarily will induce such 
fear in the mind of a reasonable man. We do not 
see how a question could be framed to elicit the 
answer of the witness as to his fear of immediate 
bodily injury, which would be less objectionable 
than the question propounded to the witness 
in this case. If the question had been put in the 
alternative, as to whether or not the witness 
was actually afraid of the defendant doing him 
bodily harm if he did not obey the orders of the 
defendant, the courts generally would approve 
such a question. The question propounded could 
be answered “Yes” or “No,” but the witness said, 
in answer to the question, “That is what I thought, 
if I didn’t.” The question was not leading. 
(Emphasis added)
State v. Karri, 84 Mont. 130, 276 P. 427, 428-29 
(1929). 
So, “You were at the scene, yes or no?” is not leading.  “You 
were at the scene, weren’t you?” is leading.  But both forms of 
this question seek preliminary information, so even the leading 
version should probably go without objection, because it helps 
develop the witness’s testimony.  
When you get to the guts of the case, though, you have to 
be much more careful and your opponent should be alert to, 
and make, the objection “Leading.”  Both of these questions are 
leading and the objection should be sustained:
“You saw the defendant, David Dastardly, there, didn’t 
you?”  
“And he raised the gun and shot Vanessa Victim?”
The lawyer here is clearly not just suggesting the answer, but 
in fact giving it.  
The non-leading way to get the information is much slower 
and less efficient, but complies with the personal knowledge 
requirement of Rule 602:
“Did you see anyone at the scene?” “Yes.”
“Whom did you see?” “A guy named David Dastardly, who 
EVIDENCE, from previous page
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was talking to a woman.”
“How did you know who he was?” “We used to play city 
league softball on the same team.”
“Are you sure of your identification of David?” “Absolutely.”
“What happened next?” “David pulled out a gun and shot 
the woman.”
TIPS FOR LEADING  
AND NON-LEADING QUESTIONS
The easiest way to comply with both the statutory definition 
and the purpose of Rule 611(c), is to get from the witness his 
or her own recollection of the matter in his or her own words.  
You should use journalistic wording in your questions to do just 
that:
“Who….”
“What….”
“When…”
“Where….”
“Why….”
“How…”
If we were making a movie, on direct the spotlight should be 
on the witness.  The lawyer’s only role is a short question, out of 
the view of the camera.  The jury’s attention is on the witness, 
who is the person who knows “Who [did] What When, Where 
and Why.”  If we were to graph out the Q and A, it should be 
like this:
Q.  _________________________________________
A.  __________________________________________
 ____________________________________________
 ____________________________________________
The questions are short, just enough to get the witness to 
understand what part of the story she should tell now.  The 
answers explain to the jury what the witness saw or heard or 
tasted or felt or smelt (personal knowledge).  Therefore, the 
witness answers at length, describing what she knows to the 
jury.  
One of my favorite trial-teaching scenes is from the pilot 
episode of the (sadly discontinued) TV series “Conviction.”  
A budding prosecutor is sent to court on her first solo trial.  
Within her first few questions of her first witness, the judge says 
“Sustained.”  She turns to him and says “Your Honor, there 
was no objection.”  He responds that he objected, and then 
instructs the bailiff: “Tell her.”  The bailiff says “No leading on 
direct.”  She says “Of course” and immediately resumes leading.  
The judge interrupts again, and the bailiff says, “Just ask ‘What 
happened next’”.  The lawyer tries that, and it works.  She is 
stumped for her next question, quiet for a minute, and then tries 
again: “What happened next?”  It works every time, for her and 
for us.
The opposite is true when we can lead, either because 
we are doing a true cross-examination or because we have 
a special circumstance direct:  the witness is having trouble 
communicating the basics, or the witness is an adverse party 
or associated with the adverse party (his mom), or the witness 
manifests hostility.  Now, the lawyer is on center stage, and the 
witness is relegated to agreeing (or not) with the substantive 
statements the lawyer makes as part of the question.  Cross 
should graph out like this:
Q.  ____________________________________ , right?4
A. Yes.
Q.  And you agree that  _________________________ ?
A.  Yes.
Q.  ___________________________________, correct?
A. Yes.
The cardinal rule when leading is to LEAD! Don’t turn the 
reins over to the witness, who is by definition the friend of 
your opponent.  As soon as she can disagree with you, she will.  
Worse, as soon as you give her a chance to run, she will.  The 
predicates of the questions which you can and should ask on 
direct can be fatal on cross.  
Example:  
Q.  You weren’t there at Joan’s house that 
night, were you?
A. No.
Q.  You were across the river, right?
A. Yes.
Q.  Your own house is across the river from 
Joan’s?
A. Yes.
Q.  About one hundred feet away?
A.  Yes.  
Q.  And it was dark?
A.  It was.
Q.  How could you see Joan shoot Vivian?  
[Ouch! Here it comes!]
A.  Well, I had just finished serving in the 
SEALS, and I had bought my own night-vision 
binoculars.  I was outside trying them out.  I am 
not proud of this, but I was kind of spying on Joan 
because I thought she was pretty attractive.  I had 
crept right up to the riverbank on my side and 
climbed a tree so I was looking right at her dock.  I 
could see what happened clear as a bell.
Don’t you wish you had just left it at “It was dark?”  
WHY CAN WE LEAD ON CROSS?
Rule 611(c), both in Montana and the federal system, 
explicitly allows leading questions on cross-examination:  
“Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-
examination.”  The federal drafters explained that this simply 
4  The questions on cross can be longer, because they are actually assertions.  Even 
so, beware the temptation to make them too long and/or complex.  Every part you 
add to a single question raises the chance the witness could disagree.  More impor-
tantly, if you have several good points, it is more persuasive to make them one at a 
time than to pile them all together.
EVIDENCE, from previous page
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continued a long-standing tradition:
The rule also conforms to tradition in making the use of 
leading questions on cross-examination a matter of right. 
The purpose of the qualification “ordinarily” is to furnish a 
basis for denying the use of leading questions when the cross-
examination is cross-examination in form only and not in fact, 
as for example the “cross-examination” of a party by his own 
counsel after being called by the opponent (savoring more of 
re-direct) or of an insured defendant who proves to be friendly 
to the plaintiff.
Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 611(c) (1972).  The 
Montana Commission Comment is slightly more helpful on the 
question of why leading is allowed on cross:
The subdivision also recognizes that leading 
questions should ordinarily be allowed on cross-
examination because the purpose of cross-
examination is to discredit testimony and this 
is where leading questions are most effective. 
The use of the word “ordinarily” in the second 
sentence is intended to allow a court to deny use 
of leading questions when cross-examination is in 
form only, such as cross-examination of a party 
by his counsel after being called as an adverse 
witness or of a friendly witness. The use of leading 
questions is ultimately a question for the trial 
court under Rule 611(a). (Emphasis added)
My own explanation is that when you are doing cross-
examination, you “ordinarily” have not called the witness in 
your own case, probably because her testimony is not helpful at 
the least, and harmful in the worst case scenario, to your case.  
The witness has given her story, and knows that you are trying 
to poke holes in it.  Even if she isn’t particularly associated with 
your opponent (she’s not his mom, sister, wife, friend etc.), she 
has some pride in the accuracy of her version of the facts.  She 
will naturally be wary of any suggestion you, her enemy, make.  
If the information in your leading question is not strictly true, 
she will not be inclined to agree.  In essence, she is sitting on 
the witness stand with her arms crossed, waiting for a chance to 
disagree with you.  Instead of being the compliant Carole King, 
your witness is Alanis Morissette, singing “Narcissus:”
Dear narcissus boy,
 I know you’ve never really apologized for 
anything.
 I know you’ve never really taken 
responsibility. 
 I know you’ve never really listened to a 
woman.
Better not ask her a non-leading question, allowing her to 
launch.  Even if you lead, of course, you had better be absolutely 
accurate in every part of your question so you can make her 
agree with you, because for sure she won’t if she doesn’t have 
to.  Therein lies the guarantee of accuracy in her answers, based 
on her own personal knowledge and not the suggestion of the 
questioner.
Thus, one of the very easiest objections to overcome is 
when you are on cross and your opponent objects to your 
question as “Leading, Your Honor.” You only have to observe: 
“I’m on cross-examination” and the judge should overrule the 
objection.
HOW STRICT IS THE RULE?
The Rule itself is rife with possibilities for escape: “except 
as necessary to develop the witness’ testimony;” on cross-
examination; when the party calls a hostile witness, an adverse 
party, or a witness associated with an adverse party.  The FRE 
Advisory Committee Note to the original version submitted by 
the Supreme Court to Congress acknowledged the laxness of 
the rule and specifically allowed leading questions to adverse 
parties and witnesses associated with them:
Within this tradition, however, numerous 
exceptions have achieved recognition: The 
witness who is hostile, unwilling, or biased; the 
child witness or the adult with communication 
problems; the witness whose recollection is 
exhausted; and undisputed preliminary matters. 
3 Wigmore §§ 774–778. An almost total 
unwillingness to reverse for infractions has been 
manifested by appellate courts. See cases cited in 
3 Wigmore §770. The matter clearly falls within 
the area of control by the judge over the mode 
and order of interrogation and presentation and 
accordingly is phrased in words of suggestion 
rather than command. [Emphasis added]
When the Court’s version got to Congress, the House 
Judiciary Committee extended the Court’s permissive language 
further, to clarify that the ability to use leading questions 
applied in both civil and criminal cases, and to “hostile 
witnesses” as well as to adverse parties and those associated 
with them. (On the other hand, the House added language to 
ensure that leading questions could not be used when a witness 
was friendly to the questioner, even if the examination itself was 
technically a “cross-examination,” such as where one party had 
been called on “direct” by her opponent).  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee was skeptical that the House changes improved 
the Court’s proposed rule, but in the end concluded that the 
changes were acceptable:
However, concluding that it was not intended 
to affect the meaning of the first sentence of the 
subsection and was I, intended solely to clarify the 
fact that leading questions are permissible in the 
interrogation of a witness, who is hostile in fact, 
the committee accepts that House amendment.
Long before the FRE and, in particular, Rule 611(c) 
were adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the effect 
of leading questions in a case arising in Montana.  Alfred J. 
Urlin sued the Northern Pacific Railroad for personal injuries 
he suffered in a derailment.  The jury returned a verdict for 
$7500 (which in 2013 dollars would be $208,350).  The railroad 
appealed, partly because of allegedly leading questions put to 
one of the medical witnesses at trial.  Without deciding whether 
EVIDENCE, from previous page
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in fact the question was leading (I don’t think it was), the Court 
overruled the error, saying:
The first assignment avers error in permitting 
the medical witnesses who testified in behalf of the 
plaintiff to be asked whether the examinations 
made by them ‘were made in a superficial, or in 
a careful and thorough, manner.’ It is urged that 
this question was objectionable,… as leading, … It 
cannot be safely said that in no case can a court of 
errors take notice of an exception to the conduct 
of the trial court in permitting leading questions. 
But such conduct must appear to be a plain case of 
abuse of discretion.‘ We are not aware of any case 
in which a new trial has ever been granted for the 
reason that leading questions, though objected 
to, have been allowed to be put to a witness.’ 
Green v. Gould, 3 Allen, 466. ‘The allowance of 
a leading question is within the discretion of the 
court, and is not ground for reversal.’ Insurance 
Co. v. Groff, 87 Pa. St. 124. ‘Circuit courts must be 
allowed the exercise of a large discretion on the 
subject of leading questions.’ Parmelee v. Austin, 
20 Ill. 35. (Emphasis added)
N. Pac. R. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271, 273, 15 S. 
Ct. 840, 841, 39 L. Ed. 977 (1895).
The Montana jurisprudence is similar.  MRE 611(c) contains 
language generally prohibiting leading questions on direct, but 
with specific exceptions for hostile witnesses and those identified 
with adverse parties, as well as when “necessary” to develop the 
testimony.   The Montana cases, discussed more specifically 
below, show the same inclination as the federal courts to support 
the trial judge in her discretion on this point.  The Montana 
Commission Comment to 611(c) acknowledged this:
The cases have also indicated that allowing 
leading questions where improper is a technical 
error and will only rarely be grounds for a 
new trial. Hefferlin v. Karlman, supra; State v. 
Kanakaris, 54 Mont. 180, 183, 169 P 482 (1917); 
and State v. Collett, supra.  The cases have also 
recognized some of the exceptions to the rule 
generally disallowing leading questions on direct 
examination. In State v. Spotted Hawk, supra, the 
Supreme Court found that when witnesses were 
illiterate or unable to speak English, examination 
should be allowed by leading questions, a view 
affirmed in State v. Collett, supra at 478. In 
Hefferlin v. Karlman, supra, the court held it was 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to 
permit leading questions to establish a foundation, 
for it was a preliminary matter. Finally, in State 
v. Karri, 84 Mont. 130, 136, 276 P 247 (1929), the 
court held it was proper for the prosecution to ask 
a leading question which contained specific words 
which established an element of the crime.
Thus, both state and federal courts recognize the rule against 
leading on direct, but trial courts’ rulings on leading objections 
are almost always affirmed on appeal.  
MONTANA CASES ON 611(C)
In City of Kalispell v. Miller, 2010 MT 62, the City charged 
Miller with obstructing a police officer.  Miller had called the 
City police dispatcher and reported that her lover, Benware, 
was with her at the bar.  In fact, Benware had left the bar after 
an argument and only 12 minutes before Miller made the call, 
had been in an automobile accident.  Miller allegedly called to 
prevent the police department from responding to a call from 
another friend asking for a welfare check on Benware.  (Benware 
was a city employee and Miller was afraid the welfare check 
might cause Benware to lose her job).
At trial, the City prosecutor called Benware as a witness and 
asked the Court for permission to treat her as a “hostile” witness 
under M.R.E. 611(c).  The Court granted the request.  On 
appeal, Miller argued that Benware was not hostile to the City 
and the prosecutor should not have been allowed to use leading 
questions to examine her.  The Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
judge’s decision as within its discretion, commenting:
¶ 27 There is no question that Miller and 
Benware had a close association at the time of this 
trial however the relationship might have been 
characterized for the jury5. Accordingly, under the 
text of the rule, interrogation by leading questions 
would be permitted because Benware was clearly 
“identified with an adverse party.” While the 
better course on remand would be for the State to 
establish hostility on direct examination before 
seeking to treat Benware as hostile, we cannot 
conclude under the text of the rule that the court’s 
preliminary ruling in this regard was an abuse of 
discretion….
¶ 28  …we affirm … the Trial Court’s decision 
allowing Benware to be treated as a hostile witness.
In the Miller case, the Court distinguished State v. Anderson, 
211 Mont. 272, 686 P.2d 193 (1984).  Anderson was charged 
with sexually assaulting three young girls, one of whom was his 
stepdaughter.  The State listed the stepdaughter as a witness, 
but did not call her at trial.  Anderson then called her in his 
defense case, and asked that she be treated as “hostile.”  The 
trial judge denied the motion until the girl’s testimony revealed 
hostility.  When she did testify, without leading questions, she 
absolved Anderson.  The Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
judge’s decision to require non-leading questions as within his 
discretion.  
The Miller court acknowledged,  “the well-known exception 
to the general provision against leading questions exists when 
the witness is a child (see State v. Eiler, 234 Mont. 38, 46, 762 
P.2d 210, 215 (1988) and Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 421, 
5  Another issue in this case is whether the City should have been allowed to intro-
duce evidence that the relationship between the two women, Miller and Benware, 
was an intimate one.  The Court divided sharply on this point, holding 4-3 that this 
was error and remanding the case for a new trial.
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603 P.2d 259, 261 (1979)),” but distinguished those cases from 
Anderson and found that Anderson supported its affirmance of 
the trial court decision in Miller:
¶ 26 …In Anderson, despite clear precedent 
that a demonstration of hostility was not required 
before a child witness could be interrogated with 
leading questions, we nonetheless acknowledged a 
trial court’s broad discretion to issue such a ruling 
and deferred to it. We do so here as well.
In State v. Eiler, 234 Mont. 38, 762 P.2d 210 (1988), the 
victim/witness of the alleged sexual abuse was an 8 year old.  The 
trial judge allowed the prosecution to use leading questions to 
examine her, and the Supreme Court affirmed:
In the case on appeal, Dr. Jarvis testified that 
S.A. and other children who are involved in sexual 
abuse cases, do not want to talk about the incident. 
S.A.’s videotaped deposition clearly corroborates 
Dr. Jarvis’ expert opinion that child victims of 
sexual abuse are reticent witnesses. The trial court 
also noted in its memorandum on the competency 
issue, “it is noticeably difficult for her to testify 
about her experiences, a circumstance which 
is understandable and not unusual for a child 
witness in this type of case.” We find that there was 
no abuse of discretion by the District Court for 
allowing leading questions by the prosecution.
234 Mont. at 46.
State v. Hibbs, 239 Mont. 308, 780 P.2d 182 (1989), involved 
two child witnesses who were 6 and 7 years old.  The Court here 
held that leading questions by the prosecutor were within the 
trial court’s discretion, even without the sort of express findings 
the trial judge made in Eiler:
Hibbs objected to the leading nature of the 
prosecution’s direct examination of two child 
victims and argues that the prosecution failed to 
establish that leading questions were necessary 
to develop the witnesses’ testimony. However, in 
Bailey v. Bailey (1979), 184 Mont. 418, 603 P.2d 
259, 261, this Court set forth an exception to the 
general rule against leading questions on direct 
examination where a child witness is involved. The 
rationale behind the exception is that questioning 
a child is a difficult task. See State v. Eiler 
(Mont.1988), 762 P.2d 210, 45 St.Rep. 1710; State 
v. Howie (Mont.1987), 744 P.2d 156, 44 St.Rep. 
1711. As this Court stated in Eiler, 762 P.2d at 215, 
whether or not leading questions will be allowed 
is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. See also 
Bailey, 603 P.2d at 261. The District Court need 
not make express findings that leading questions 
are necessary. We hold that the questioning was 
proper.
239 Mont. at 312.
Bailey v. Bailey, supra, was a divorce case, in which custody 
was disputed.  The judge interviewed the parties’ children in 
chambers and then awarded custody to their mother.  The father 
argued on appeal that the judge erred in asking the youngest 
child leading questions (the case does not give the age of that 
child).  In affirming the award and the procedure, the Supreme 
Court quoted from both the Montana Commission Comment 
and the Federal Advisory Committee note:
Leading questions may be asked if necessary 
to develop testimony, Rule 611(c), Mont.R.Evid., 
and whether or not they will be allowed is a matter 
for the trial court’s discretion. See Commission 
Comment to Rule 611(c). One of the well known 
exceptions to the general provision against 
leading questions is when the witness is a child. 
Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule 611(c), 
(1972), 56 F.R.D. 183, 275. Here, where counsel 
noted at oral argument that the youngest child 
was rather withdrawn, the asking of leading 
questions is not an abuse of discretion. (Emphasis 
added).
184 Mont. 421.
CONCLUSION
That was interesting, wasn’t it?
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
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